Chinese Spy Arrested

PUBLISHED: 6:16 PM 26 Sep 2018

Chinese Agent Arrested In Chicago

Barack Obama’s lax immigration policies allowed a Chinese spy to be planted on U.S. soil. Are Chicago’s sanctuary policies allowing sleeper cells?

Is there a “cell” of clandestine spies operating in the liberal home base of Obama and Rahm Emanuel?

Chinese National Ji Chaoqun was arrested in liberal sanctuary Chicago, Illinois, accused of being a secret agent for the People’s Republic. Barack Obama’s administration gave him an “F1 Visa” to study electrical engineering, then allowed him to roam back and forth to mainland China for meetings with his handlers.

Obama officials even negligently let him join the military MAVNI program for immigrants with “special” skills “vital to the national interest.” Apparently, they took his word for it that he didn’t have any contact with a foreign government, without bothering to check. The entire incident has sparked serious questions about the Chicago connection.

Only weeks ago, “freelance triple agent” Kevin Mallory was arrested in Chicago, for “simultaneously selling secrets to Chinese intelligence officers for $25,000 and exposing those spies to his old colleagues at the Central Intelligence Agency,” The Chicago Tribune reported.

Some speculate, “what makes Chicago so special to the Chinese?” Is there a “cell” of clandestine spies operating in the liberal home base of Obama and Rahm Emanuel? Just like Ji, Mallory’s case involves “details of how the Chinese recruit and communicate with foreign assets.”

Chinese intelligence instructed the 27-year-old to gather background reports. Eight prime targets in the tech sector were selected for recruitment. Ji dutifully disguised them as “mid-term test questions” when he turned them in.

“All eight individuals referenced in the background check documents were naturalized U.S. citizens born in Taiwan or China now living in the United States.” All either currently worked in or were recently retired from “a career in the science and technology industry, including several individuals specializing in aerospace fields.” At least seven worked for “cleared U.S. defense contractors.”

Now, Ji faces up to ten years in prison for that crime alone. One count of “knowingly acting in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Attorney General.” He could have been charged with more serious crimes but this one is practically guaranteed to stick.

Ji was granted approval to enter the U.S. in 2013 under the pretense of studying electrical engineering at Chicago’s “Illinois Institute of Technology.” By 2016, he was “allowed to join the U.S. Army Reserves” as a specialist.

He denied in writing and in a follow up interview that he “had contact with a foreign government in the past seven years.”

The 17 page criminal complaint and Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Andrew McKay’s affidavit paint a bold picture that says he knew exactly what he was doing and who he was working for.

McKay explains that China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) “handles civilian intelligence collection and is responsible for counter-intelligence and foreign intelligence.” The Jiangsu Province Ministry of State Security (JSSD) is a provincial department of the MSS.

In October of 2017, An ongoing investigation in Ohio generated a search warrant which revealed an email account who’s user was “communicating, coordinating and directing an individual in the United States (Individual A) to provide technical information from a U.S.-based company without authorization.”

The engineer works for a company “among the world’s top aircraft engine suppliers for both commercial and military aircraft.”

That led to an iCloud account. On it they found a file referencing someone else who was already on FBI radar. “Intelligence Officer A.” identified as “a Deputy Division Director of the JSSD.”

Individual A’s residence was raided producing “a business card for an individual purportedly employed by an Association for Science and Technology, located in China.” That was Officer A on the down-low. The iCloud also held a text message from December 2013.

Intelligence Officer A wrote, “the customer does not know our identity. I approached him with the identity of the Deputy Secretary-General employed by an Association for Science and Technology.” That demonstrates Officer A likes to use aliases.

The iCloud messages also mention Ji Chaoqun. They “suggest Ji was introduced to Intelligence Officer A by Intelligence Officer B.” Around November 29, 2013, Officer B asked Officer A “Can little Ji use his/her real name to fill out forms?”

Around December 18, 2013, Officer B texted Officer A “Ji would be on High Speed Rail G203 arriving at Nanjing South Station at 22:37.” Officer A replied back “Got it. Tell him that I’m a professor at Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics.”

Officer A texted Ji directly at least 36 times between December, 2013, and July, 2015.

Ji flew to Beijing on or around December 9, 2013, returning in mid-January. He went back to China a couple months later on May 19, 2014, and came home in July. His third trip was at the end of 2014 just before Christmas.

When he hit the ground in Beijing in December of 2013, he texted officer A. “Hi Big Brother, I’m Ji Chaoqun. I’m taking the G203…” They then exchanged messages to arrange their very first meeting.

Officer A wanted to meet again, so on January 10, 2014, Ji texted him that he “was on the subway.” Officer A told him which stop to get off at.

“Approximately five hours after this conversation, Intelligence Officer A informed his wife via text message that he had a suite in a hotel and asked her if she would like to stay.” The FBI believes the hotel was used for the meeting with Ji and afterward Officer A didn’t want to see it go to waste.

Ji knew all along that Officer A was no professor. When he met with an undercover FBI agent he admitted, “he believed Intelligence Officer A was part of a ‘confidential unit’ with Intelligence Officer B, and that Intelligence Officer B told him stories about espionage.”

On April 25, 2018, Ji met with an undercover FBI Special Agent (the UC). The UC introduced himself to Ji as someone “directed to meet with Ji by Intelligence Officer C in light of Intelligence Officer A’s arrest.”

Their second meeting recorded Ji explaining, “he was first introduced to Intelligence Officers A and B via Intelligence Officer C, who he met during a recruitment fair while in school in China. He stated he believed Intelligence Officers A, B, and C were in the same “confidential unit.”

“Initially when I met Intelligence Officer C, it was during a recruitment fair in the IM school. There was not much advertising. They were asking if anyone was interested in joining the organization. They said it was a confidential unit but they did not elaborate.”

One time, over dinner, Officer B “told me stories such as Long-Tan-San-Jie, the three covert CCP agents inside KMT.”

The FBI explains that translates to “three heroes of the dragon’s lair.” In the late 1920’s the Chinese Communist Party “seeded” three spies into their main rival political party KMT. The three “successfully gained employment with and access to sensitive KMT information.”